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The Case of Three Prepaid Health Programs
Gale Miller
Department of Sociology, Anthropology,
and Social Work
Marquette University
Charles K. Warriner
Department of Sociology
University of Kansas
ABSTRACT: An imoortant perspective emerging in the areas of
community and organizational analysis is the political economry
approach to interorcari zational relations. This approach treats
organizations as see-ers of basic political and economic resources
This aporoach has s-ec'a'
which are. found in their environments.
i-plications for persons interested in the study and/or .ipleentation of programs of change, because it se;nsiti:_s tne nbserver
to the problems of political and economic conflict in interThe perspective alse offers useful
orgai ationas relationu.
insights into the development of. intervention strategies that
in
minimize the conflicts often associated wnith social change.
order to demonstrate the usefulness of this approach to socia,
change and interornanizational relations, three attempts at cree-"nc
prepaid health care programs in rural areas of the midwest are
consi dered.
Historically, sociologists have tended to treat social change
within a macroscopic perspective that emphasizes the unplanned and
societal-wide consequences of general social movements and trends. 1
Recently, some socioloqists have turned their attention to less
encompassing attempts at social change that involve implementation
of limited programs of change that are restricted to the community
or sectors within it. Such efforts include attempts to alter the
community sectors of juvenile justice, social welfare, and healh
care. 2 In an effort to distinuuish this type of social change f-cr.
others,

Warren calls iL "purposive social chane".

3

This is

planned change that takes the form of specific programs of action
that seek to alter the existing type and/or range of services ir
the community. Purposive social changes takes place within a
restricted and identifiable environment or organizations,
associations and publics that constitute the local community.
Thus, not only does purposive social change have an outcome that
is limited to the community level, but the community elements th at
are most likely to be influenced by the change also constitute a
portion of the most immediate and relevant environment of the
change agent.
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This paper is concerned with the relationship between
purposive social change and community organization. Specifically,
this paper reports the findings of an exploratory study on factors
influencing the implementation of three prepaid health care
programs in three rural communities in the midwest. Before
considering the research itself, it is necessary to review the
important theoretical and empirical concepts and issues that
surround the study and analysis.
THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT OF PURPOSIVE SOCIAL CHANGE
In the past the community has been conceputalized from a
number of perspectives, but recently some sociologists have begun
to treat it as a social unit that is mad up of interconnected
Although the linkages
organizations, associations and publics.
between the organizational components may vary from community to
community or even shift over time within a single community, it
is possible to conceputalize the various components and linkages
as sufficiently stable that they constitute a series of networks
that are directed toward differing areas of community activity and
The community, for example, is partially made up of a
control.
health care network, a criminal justice network and a social
wel fare network.
Because communities are conceptualized as sets of interorganizational networks, a central problem involves the sources
for network integration. That is, what are the factors that
contribute to the linkage of the various organizations,
associations and publics? Because much of this research has
been directed toward limited types of interorganizational
linkages, the findings tend to emphasize single factors. Thus,
Levine and White emphasize the importance of exchange relations,
Litwak and Hylton emphasize coordinating agencies, Dill stresses
information, and Aiken and Hage emphasize the integrating
consequences of joint programs. 5 Recognizing the limited influence
of any single factor, other analysts have attempted to identify
sets of factors that simultaneously operate to integrate interorganizational networks. Evan's notion of the organization set is,
for example, basedr-on the combined influence of personnel role-sets,
information, personnel flows and flows of products and services. 6
Similarly, Perrow emphasizes the impact of various types of
"technological inputs" and Warren, et. al. stress the combined
impact of domain agreements, system norms, and institutionalized
thought structure.1
Recently, several analysts have attempted to bring the various
factors influencing interorganizational integration into a more
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Qeneral and theoretical perspective, i.e., the political economy
approach. 8 This perspective is perhaps best summarized by Benson
who claims that organizations are
concerned with the
problem of resource acquisition. 9 primarily
The most critical resources
beino money and authorit.
Authority is the basis fr
tie
ornanization's ddriai which consists of -areements aout the nature
and types of activities that it can control. Money, on the other
hand, is a basic resource that is necessary for developing and
maintaining organizational Facilities, proqrams, and personnel.
[nterorganizational networks er-erae out of the ro-ess of resource
c..c
rnS 0 F
fa
....
aihe
acquisition because the
enendency become necessary if
-rnns
are t att. in-. L:
resources that are required for operation. Uhen the relations of
exchange and dependency become patterned and stabilized, it is
possible to speak of the interorganizational networks as beinqin.
The equilibriur is nt totaly sa state oc ecuiiibi:m.Anoweer
it is sza'i ized to t-he exte'lt that r sources
. r

_0; flow and Are Cis7:' I7:Z

.

n 7;

:S, .re

-Z.ut

a cnanmei

either the flow or distribution of resources will disrupt the
equilibrium. When this occurs, units within the interorgani.'tional
network act to preserve or expand their control over basic re.;ources.
YMany efforts a: O r2,J:iVE socia:l cha, ,.e ,nave thc ene-,r'-consecuence of ,.isrctinc tne est.hi'shed .attern.- f in.-erConsequen tl.
organizational relations within the communit.y.
efforts at purposive social change may--intentionally or
unintentionally--provide some members of an interorganizational
network with the opportunity to increase their cuntrol over basic
resources. Those orcanizaticrns that successful 1.;/ tak .so acvanta-e
of such opportunities vill improve their political and econorc
In addition, there is another possibie
positions in the community.
consequence of purposive social change that is important for those
concerned with community organization and social change. That is,
many of the most fundamental bases of interorqanizational ocw-,r are
often hidden durinn times cf stability and e.'uilitriun,

inceec,

may be recogni-ed by .OrCanzational leaders that. ic ibest interests to mystify or in some other way hide some features
of their relationships with other organizations. Because they
disrupt both the obvious and the hidden asoects of interorganizatior,,al
relations, efforts at purposive social chnrice often have the
unintended consequence of ex:oWc the most 05asi0 so-res for
interorsanizational power ad dominance. The study of inter
organizational relations during times of purposive social change,
then, offers a number of advantages to those persons interested in
developing the political economy perspective.
will consider "o,. so0fle
e
-er
in the final section of the
of the issues raised here are re!a e, to the proble of chancing
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the organization and delivery of health care services within
communities. Before turning to these issues, however, it is
necessary to look at the nature of the research project and
the research findings on which this paper is based. These
concerns occupy the next two sections.
RESEARCH PROBLEM AND DESIGN
The research that is partially sumarized below is part of
an exploratory study of nine attempts at creating prepaid health
care programs in six different communities in the states of
Iowa, M1issouri, Kansas, and Nebraska. All of the communities
are of relatively small size with the largest being a city of a
little less than three hundred thousand. The significant community
factor influencing the development of these programs, however, is
not population size, but the nature of the interorganizational
relations that constitute their health care networks. This is
especially true for many rural areas where the health care network
may extend over a large territory and is not limited to a single
town.
Each of the health organizations studied claimed to be a
part of the general "health maintenance organization (HMO)
movement" that seeks to restructure health care organization and
delivery. Like many similar programs of change, the qeneral inint
of HMO legislation is subject to differences in interpretation.
Tessler and Mechanic summarize its major intent by stating:
Its primary goals are to encourage early and preventive
medical care utilization through comprehensive benefits made
available to consumers on a prepaid basis, to guard against,
unnecessary hospitalization and surgery through financial
disincentives to providers, and to foster efficiency through
the poolino of resources and the effective use of health
manpower.13
Thus, the major goals of the HMO movement are the reduction
of medical costs through preventive practices, the efficient use
of medical knowledge and personnel and the discouragement of
unnecessary services. The Health Maintenance Organization Act of
1973 also implies that HMOs offer the opportunity to expand medical
care to persons and groups that have previously not had regular
access to such care, such as the poor. 1 4 In addition, they offer
a means of introducing greater consumer influence into the
organization and delivery of health care services. The HMO Act,
for example, requires that all HMOs have consumer membership on
In general, HMOs represent a potentially
policy boards.
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innovative approach to health care organization and delivery
that could have implications for consumers and providers alike.
Whether HMOs are effective in achieving these goals. is,
of course, a subject of considerable debate. Some observers note
that although HMOs may not be a panacea for current American health
care problems, there is evidence that they are effectiIe in

achieving some of their goals. 1 5 Others note that HM,.,0s are of-en
implemented in such a way that they either do not significantly
change the established practice of medicine or they exacerbate the
problem of paitient powerlessness and estranement from providers
6
rt is
by encouraaing impersonal and "assembly-line" practices.1
fot the purpose of this paper to assess the effecti.eness cf ''
in achiezvino their oals, nor to take sides in this debate: rather,
witn
ei
it is to discuss some of r.e
irobl- smasscav
establishment in rural areas.
It shoul- be noted, howe-er, rhac
.
many of the prorvises of the i.MO movement are of sjcia iToc.:&
dsdflan
eA
to rural people because these areas are adong t-.e mr'ost
in receiving integrated and comprehensive health care. For this
the
reason, many persons concerned oith rural nealth car- look ur
HMO movement with considerable interest.17 The evidence indicates,
however, that althoun
?.:,s E:a,
. use;-,l in eel
-ing vi
problems of rural health car delivery, these organiuz.ions tend
to locate in other areas."
, to establish i.-i,MOs in rural areas is, then,
The issue of how,
an important one for both practitioners and theorits in -the area=s
of health care delivery and interorganizational relations. Durin q
the time of this research (1975-76), formal government criteria
relevance in most rural cowmunitics.
defining HMOs were of littie
Like many urban prepayment programs, many rural people interested
in the HrIO concept found the government cuidelines too restrictive
and expensive; consequently, they did not seek government
certification, although" they did incorporate
of the characterTf aZic e
-_, I,'many.%
Tf a strictar
istics of certified H"'Os in their programs.definition had been used, the research would have been impossible.
because at that time there were no full-flm.edeed IM0s in the rur:
areas of these four states. Because none of the programs were
certified as HMOs, they are here referred to as "prepaid health
care programs."
The major technique used in the research was,,as
tne inter-iew and.
for the most part, the data were collected through interviews with
as many knowledgeable persons within the community health care retworks as possible. Because each health care netw.ork varied in its
elements and organization, there was some variation in the types of
persons and organizations contacted, but in ceneral the sponsor or
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sponsors of the prepaid programs were interviewed, as were
representatives of the local medical associations and other
physicians, hospital administrators, members of the local
health planning councils and any other persons or agency
officials who were found to be significant in influencing
the fate of these programs. In all eighty persons representing
sixty-one organizations, associations, or ptblics were
contacted. In addition, public documents--such as feasibility
studies, grant applications, newspaper reports and official
minutes of meetings--were used to supplenent the interview data.
Data were collected on the nature of the health care networks within the communities, the implications of the prepaid
programs for those networks, and the responses of members of
the networks to the new programs. Because the research was
exploratory, the data collection and analysis techniques were
qualitative, rather than quantitative. These techniques were
useful in identifying the critical events surrounding the
establishment of each of the prepaid programs studied. Because
it is difficult to fully report on nine case studies in a short
papor, we have selected three cases to discuss here. Each of
these cases is representative of the general findings of the
research. in addition, each represents.a different approach to
the introduction of prepaid health care programs into rural
areas. Thus, they provide a basis for the more general
discussion of the best ways to create change within the political
and economic structure of rural communities. This discussion will
follow the description of the cases.
THREE APPROACHES TO IMPLEMENTING PREPAID HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS
IN RURAL AREAS
Case One
This case involves a collaborative attempt by a local migrant
worker organization and the federal Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (HEW) to provide health care services to the rural poor
and others in an eight county area of this state. The local agency
was originally organized by HEW to Provide housing and related
services to migrant workers in iQp 1940s and 1950s. Because many
of the migrant workers remained in the area, the organization has
more recently become involved in health care services. Specifically,
the organization developed a health care program for the settled
workers that was similar to a standard medicaid program. That is,
the migrant worker organization certified the eligibility of the
applicants and the local providers provided the medical services.
One important problem with this program, however, was that the
migrant worker organization had no control over the providers' fees
and, consequently, some providers charged exorbitant fees to such
patients.
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Because the migrant worker organization had experience with
a significant portion of the poor population and the medical
providers in the area, the HEW plan for a prepayment program
was implemented through it. The plan was not limited to former
migrant workers, but was intended to include the general
population of the area, since they all suffer from the problem
of inadequate health care services. As the program developed,
it ke-came separate from its oriqinal sponsor and developed a
new &dministrative component and new agreements with providers.
The major changes accompanying the program were for
physicians. Under this plan, each physician member receives
eighty percent of his or her usual fee for each prepaid patient
treated. The other twenty percent was held until the end of the
fiscal year (in part, to protect against cost overruns) and the
money left at this time was distributed among the physicians.
One reason for this practice was the desire to build into the
program an incentive for reducing overtreatment. None of the
other medical providers were directly affected by the program.
The hospitals, for example, continued to receive fee-for-service
payments.
The new program did, however, introduce a new organization
into the local health care network. This organization was the.
administrative component of the prepaid program. Indeed, the
addition of this organization into the interorganizational network was important because it continued to maintain its ties to
HEW which provided funds for both the indigent members of the
program and its administrators. Thus, the prepaid health care
program emerged as a powerful element in the health care network
of this region. In addition, its initial development and power
rested on the actions of an agency outside the local area. This
is one important reason why the program was resisted by many
local providers, particularly physicians. There are three primary
factors that account for this resistance.
The first factor is the time and location of the implementation of the program. The program was not introduced into all
eight counties at the same time; rather, a three county area was
initially selected for the program and it was gradually introduced into the other counties. This procedure was consistent with
the general policy of the planners and administrators who hoped to
continue to expand the territory of the program until it included
much of this region of the state (perhaps as many as twenty-two
counties). A major source of resistance to the program was the
physicians located in the original three counties. Related to
this, and the second factor, was resistance based on type of
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medical practice and setting. Generally, the solo and small
group practitioners who practice general and family medicine
were most resistant to the program and the practices in the
oricinal counties were overwhelmingly of this type. Thus, the
resistance of the physicians in the initial counties should not
be interpreted exclusively in terms of the time factor.
A final factor influencing the resistance o- some physicians
(particularly, those in the original three counties) was the
procedure for introducing the program. The prepaid program was
designed by members of the migrant worker organization and they
only included medical providers as consultants who were sought
out at a very late date in the planning process. Thus, some
resistance to the program stemmed from suspicions of physicians
and others about the full implications of the program for their
practices. This suspicion and resentment was exacerbated by two
additional factors. First once the prepaid program was placed in
a new organization, the issue of selecting a project director
became important. According to those who resisted the program,
a local congressman who had been instrumental in developing the
program intervened to get a local political supporter appointed as
the project director, although the person had no experience in the
field of health care. A second issue involved the continued
rejection by HEW of recommendations of the local health planning
council about the program. Although this body approved the
initial feasibility study, it consistently recommended against
HEW funding of the program that was created. Each time, however,
the program was funded and the opposition (particularly physicians)
resented it.
in sum, although the program involved relatively little change
in the practices of local providers, it was resisted because of the
way it was introduced. Of special importance here is the fact that
it was initiated by two organizations (HEW and the migrant worker
organization) outside the local health care network. Indeed, the
program did not gain significant provider support until it was
expanded into a new area that contained a large multi-specialty
clinic.
Case Two
Program Two involved a prepaid plan developed by a hospital
located in a city of about one hundred thousand. It differed from
Case One in that the sponsor is an active member of the community
health care sector and its impact was primarily limited to the
immediate community and its periphery. This program is also unique
because it was still in the planning stage at the time of'the
research and it was, therefore, impossible to study the full process
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of implementation. At the same time, the planning was
sufficiently developed that it was possible to assess the
responses of other members of the community's health care
sector. In fact, as will be seen later, the significant
factor of concern to the program planner was not the
responses of local health care providers, but uncertainty
about the requirements of federal certificatiIhias an HMO.
Another difference between Case Two and Case One is
that this program was initiated by a hospital that has been
operating a type of prepaid program for many years. The
hospital was originally built and operated by a railroad
company that limited hospital services to employees and their
dependents. It has employed a full-time staff of physicians
and other medical personnel who work for the hospital
exclusively. In addition, the board of directors of the
hospital has been dominated by members of the railroad company, both management and labor. Thus, for the past forty
years the railroad has operated on principles that are
consistent with the HMO movement.
More recently, the hospital has shifted from a strict
orientation to the railroad company to a more community-based
approach. Specifically, the hospital has begun to accept
patients from the larger community, regardless of their
occupational affiliations, and it allows its physicians to
maintain limited fee-for-service practices outside the
hospital. At the same time, the board of directors of the
hospital continues to be dominated by railroad company
employees and the majority of the hospital's patients are
affiliated with the railroad.
The history of the hospital is important in identifying
its place in the community health care sector. Specifically,
the hospital has been an important, but isolated member of the
health care network. It has served a restricted clientele that
is recognized and easily identifiable within the community. In
doing so, it has not competed with existing hospitals that serve
different segments of the community. The physicians who have
worked for the hospital have also restricted their practices to
the hospital setting and have not been involved in either
competitive or collaborative relations with other physicians.
Even with the expansion of hospital and physician services into
the larger community, the impact has been quite limited.
Consequently, it is possible to characterize the hospital, its
-staff, and clientele as isolated parts of the health care network
that are defined by clearly understood notions about proper domain.
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For the most part, the prepaid program of the hospital was
simply an extension of its past activities and more recent
movement into the nonrailroad segments of the community. As
such it involved relatively little change in the ongoing
practices of other elements of the health care sector. First,
the program had little impact on physicians because the
primary care services would be provided by three new primary
care physicians who would be recruited from outside the community
and would work for the prepaid component of the hospital
exclusively. Specialist services would be paid on a fee-forservice basis. Because the hospital was developed as a more or
less self-contained health facility, many of the services that
might otherwise involve outsiders--such as laboratory services-were already available in the hospital and would, therefore,
involve no change for these elements of the conmnunity health
care network. Similarly, the board of directors and administration of the prepaid program would be the same as those of the
larger hospital.
The responses by members of the health care sector of the
community were neither supportive or oppositional; indeed, most

responses can best be characterized as indifferent. The county
medical society, for example, oriinally established a liaison
committee to keep informed on the hospital's plans, but disbanded
it after only two meetings. In addition; interviews with
physicians and hospital administrators in the comr.unity indicated
a widespread state of ignorance about the program and very little
desire to know more about it. The indifferent response of members
of the health care network was reflected in the planners' feelinq
that the most sianificant problem retardino the implementation of
the proqram was the federal government (HEW) and the various
restrictions placed on programs seeking HMO certification.
In sum, the program was conceived by an isolated and somewhat
marginal member of the health care network. The isolation and
marginality of the hospital was largely based on the generally
recognized domain of this organization that limits its impact
primarily to one segment of the community. The prepaid program
was seen as an extension of that domain i6to the larger community,
but not a sufficient expansion to alter the hospital's domain or
relationship with other health care elements.
Case Three
Program Three was initiated by two organizations. One of the
collaborators was a private-nonprofit insurance company that was
responsible for the recruitment of members and the insurance
aspects of the program, e.g., collecting premiums and paying
charges. The other component was a multi-speciality clinic in a
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small town (less than three thousand people) which primarily
served the local and the surroundinq communities.
The clinic .,,as begun by a physician who formerly worked
for the Mayo Clinic and wished to return to his hometown and
reproduce it on a smaller scale. Thus, he wished to brinq
together a number .of specialists into a professional corporation
whiich would prov-i e soecialized treatment as well as priry care
services to persons if the area. At the time of this study, the
success of the clinic was reflected in a number of ways. First,
the clinic had a relatively large staff of Physicians and others
who provided urvly spec-alized services, includinc obstetrics.
intern& medicine, :-:tr ics, otoretry
derm at'-.rr,
dentistry, ophthamoioqy, psychiatry, and psychiatric social work.
Second, the clinic was the major health care organization that
served not only persons in the immediate community, but patients
s. Tr.
.re
from larer
ccT7ufniies i surroundnc c.nti
par-; of tne
ohysician in tile count. and he w,+as
was on ' one otpe
prepaid pronran. Using involvement in some aspect of the clin'c
as the major criterion, then, the clinic controlled all physician
services in the communirtv. Finally, the success of the clinic .as
reflected in its a-I:ity -o cet a hosci tal bi-qin the cormun:it
(about 25 years earlier) even thoucil sufficient hos.pital
facilities were available in nearby towns. It has expanded as the
clinic has nrown and demanded new Facilities and services.
.e;,I
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health care empire because it controlled most o the local health
care agencies and resources. 2 0 In addition, it was signiFicant in
shaping the health care networks of surrounding communities by
competing with rearb,, physicivis and bospitais fnr patients.
.teec,
the initiaion c-4 the precaid oroqr~rn. is besc understood within tre
larger context of the region, because its implementation was an
attempt to expand the domain of the clinic to outlyina areas.
involve--; ittle
mean.incf'- chance i.l tIe
1 he oreoaic ",rc:ra.
organization and delivery of health care services. A
of the

providers continued to operate as they had in the past with no new
controls over their operations. in addition, most of the
established financial arrancements remained. The non-cllnic
physician continued to charce the insurance comrav on a fee-forservice basis, as did the hospital and any other providers outside
the clinic who miaht be used. The physicians within the clinic were
only indirectly affected by the prepaid procram because they
continued to receive their salaries fror the clinic. The imra 7the program was indirect in that the ohvsicians--beinq partners in
the corporation--shared in the profits of the clinic at the end of
the year. The physicians Found it in their best interests to
minimize overtreatment because the insurance complany oald the clinic
a capitation fee based on the number-of :at.en: me7rers and any
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money saved from the capitation fee (profits) was distributed
among the clinic physicians.
The only source of resistance to the prooram came from
providers in the surrounding counties. Several physicians and
medical societies in these counties protested to the state
medical society and the state insurance commissioner. The claim
of the protesting physicians (which was supported by some hospital
administrators) was that the prepaid program was one more ploy in
the continuing strategy of the clinic to win patients from the
surroundino area. The state insurance commissioner responded by
requirina the prepaid program officials to abide by any decision
made by the state medical society on the matter. The state
medical society placed two limitations on the program. First, the
clinic could not offer the prepaid program to any out-of-county
patients who had not been using clinic services for two years.
Second, the clinic had to offer membership in the prepaid program
to all physicians in the surrounding area. Not surprisinoly, none
of the physicians accepted membership. Because the state medical
society limitation was for only three years, some of the competing
physicians beaan to organize themselves into group practices that
could eventually offer similar prepaid proqrams.

The third prepaid program, then, involved a sponsoring
orqanization that was centrally located witnin two interrelated
heaith care networks. It was the dominant organization within its
community and an important organization in the health care network
of the region. The involvement of the clinic in the prepaid
program was based on the competitive relations of the larger reoion
and officials of the clinic explicitly stated their primary concern
was with expanding their clientele. The major opposition to the
program, then, stemmed from competing providers in nearby counties.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The above descriptions involve several issues of importance
for students of purposive social change. First, despite the
rhetoric of the HMO movement, each program involved limited
commtqient to it. None of the programs, for example, was significantly committed to preventive health care programs, little
effort was directed to providing health care services to previously

excluded groups, and they did not offer new avenues for the
expression of patient concerns or control over health care
organizations and professionals. Instead, each of the sponsors
used the rhetoric of the HMO movement for their own ends. The
migrant worker organization and HEW used the HMO movement as a
means to justifying their alteration of the existing pattern of
funding health care for the poor, the hospital used the HMO movement
to justify expansion of a previous policy toward greater community

involvement, and the sponsoring clinic used the HIMO movement as
a mechanism for making inroads into new sources for pazients 4r.
the surrounding counties.
Looked at one way, then, these findings indicate that
orcanizations use procrams of social chance in order to better
pursue their poiitical and econonic-qoais.
There is, however,
at least one other way of looking at these cases and findings.
Each of the cases involves a somewhat different point of
introduction of change into the cormunities and their
surroundino reicons.
in the first case cqiange was initiazted b
two organizations that were tenuously connected to the health
care networks of the affected communities.
In the second case
the snonsor of the Program was an established m.!ber cf
corrunity
n eh
care neeto.!
a , thcu h:
we:
.
soa-e-a- is017o
S,, .: ate a
based on its ties to the railroad. The third case involved the
introduction of chance through an insurance company that was
external to the commuinit-; and a clinic
,t contrc'led s -ficant
port-ons of

affeced ar.

Because two of the three cases described have become
operational and the other case has neithr succeeded or failed,
it

can be clai.-d tat

eacr

o

're-

o T7 a rs a

.f

,en Ear-ie

of how p-urposive social chance can be introduced into rural areas.
On the other hand, if purposive social change is conceptualized as
involvinq some degree of cornmitment to the de,-eloniment
aoroaches to social,
robes, tho all cf th2 ca-no

of new
he see . as

equaty promisinc. Notably tihe thl-rd4 case involves no attempt or
real incentive to redefine health care and the problems associated
with it. Although the capitation arrangement between the clinic
and the insurance comLpany may be seen as one ech;anisr, for
encouraqinc cn.,ysicians to nir.iize

overtreatment and to encouraoe

preventive health practices, the major thrust of the program is not
in the direction of redefining the health care problem, the
organization of health care services or the place of the consurer
in the heith care net',.,c-rk. R.ther; this case is an exam.le or no,.programs of change can be coopted by established organizations so
that few or none of the aims of the program are achieved.
The first case ofrers a etter approach because it involves
two organizations that are connected to the local health care network, but they are not directly involved in it. It could be
assumed that such agencies are not so likely to define their self
interests in terms of the local market for cati'encs. The problen's
with this approach are apparent in the above description. First,
such an approach involves implementation through existing health
care organizations that may not view the new program favorably. A
second problen witthis acproach is that
sponsors are externaI
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to the affected communities and this may give rise to local
resistance. Such resistance may be exacerbated when local
oroviders are ignored by the planners and funders, as occurred
in Case One. The problems of such a strategy are the same as
those described by Warren, et. al.; that is, the local
organizations and professionals that are needed to implement
the new program either coopt the innovation by redefining it
within existing modes of thought and action, or they attempt
to destroy it by refusing to cooperate with the sponsor or by
engaging in political activities to discredit it.Z1
A third approach to implementing purposive social change
is offered by Case Two in which an established, but noncompetitive, agency within the community health care network
is the sponsor of the program. Several factors deserve special
note here. First, the sponsor of the program exists as an
established part of the community health care network. This
means that the sponsor has worked within the prevailing agreements
about interorganizational domains, norms and modes of thounht and
it is not an outside agency that is "imposin-" itself on the local
providers. Indeed, in this case the sponsor is an accepted and
trusted member of the health care network of the community; rather,
it has traditionally dealt with a limited clientele and responded
to a special and limited set of community interests. Such a
position has allowed the sponsor to respond to its constituency
in ways that have been different from the prevailing community
patterns without incurring serious opposition from other health
care elements. Finally, the sponsor is an established health care
provider that is organized to provide a wide range of health care
services without fundamentally altering its traditional structure.
Thus, the prepaid proqram does not involve the establishment of a
new agency in the community nor does it significantly alter the
number and types of health care professionals.
What we are suggesting is that many interorganizational networks
contain members that are accepted, but marginal. In such networks,
the marginal member if freer to innovate because such activities
are less likely to be perceived by other organizations as threatening
to the existing patterns of resource distribution>; To use the
lanquage of Benson, it is insufficient to only be conce ned with
the monetary resources of interorganizational networks. 2 Intervention
policies must also consider the issue of authority (agreements about
organizational domain). When authority is considered, the range
of viable sponsors for innovative programs is limited. In the case
of prepaid health care programs in rural areas, such sponsors
might include railroad affiliated hospitals, university medical
centers, union sponsored health programs, or rural co-ops. Because
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programs of purposive change involve considerable time, staff and
money, agencies i.nterested in facilitating change should be
selective in the organizations that are used as community-based
sponsors. In some cases, appropriate sponsors may be unavailable
and other strategies must be used, but the risks of local
opposition and cooptation are greater in these communiities.
In conclusion, the political economy perspective on
interorganizational relations is a useful approach to understanding the dynamics and problems of purposive social change.
By emphasizing the importance of resource acquisition in
interorganizational relations, this approach sensitizes observers
to the political and economic consequences of change. Equally
important, it provides a theoretical framework for developing
intervention strategies that minimize some of 'the problems
associated with purposive change. The above discussion of prepaid
health care programs is one example of the usefulness of this
approach.
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